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IS CROSSING A BORDER to seek refugee protection “essential travel”? To refugee

advocates, it is obvious that feeing human rights abuses is “essential.” Te
Canadian government, however, appears to disagree. Soon after the COVID-19
virus was declared a “global pandemic”1 they deemed the travel of truck drivers,
agricultural workers, and returning snowbirds as essential,2 but not that of
asylum seekers.3
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the use of executive powers
under the Quarantine Act to turn away refugee claimants attempting to enter

1.

2.

3.

World Health Organization, “Statement on the second meeting of the International Health
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus
(2019-nCoV)” (30 January 2020), online: <www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency
-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)> [perma.cc/
HQR4-8SP6]; Jamie Ducharme, “World Health Organization Declares COVID-19 a
‘Pandemic.’ Here’s What Tat Means,” Time Magazine (11 March 2020), online: <time.
com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemic-declaration> [perma.cc/JJ8S-GEX7].
Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of Entry
into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0161 (20 March 2020),
s 3, online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=38958&lang=en> [perma.
cc/TA85-9LL4] [OIC, 2020-0161]; Public Safety Canada, “Guidance on Essential Services
and Functions in Canada During the COVID-19 Pandemic” (9 April 2020), online: <www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/crtcl-nfrstrctr/esf-sfe-en.aspx> [perma.cc/BG4R-39HA].
Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of Entry
into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0263 (20 April 2020),
s 5, online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=39170&lang=en> [perma.
cc/2YM6-LA3A] [OIC, 2020-0263].
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the country from the United States in late March 2020.4 Te Order in Council
implementing these changes indicated that there were “no reasonable alternatives
to prevent the introduction or spread of ” COVID-19 in Canada.5 Although some
restrictions were lifted in late April, most asylum seekers continue to be barred
from entering the country.6 Refugee advocates have called this policy “arbitrary
and unjustifable.”7 We agree.
Te government has given no timeline for lifting these measures. It is not clear
what alternative measures were considered. Nor has the government explained
why it did not implement measures recommended by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to respect asylum seekers’ rights while
protecting public health. Tese recommendations included, amongst others,
either “continu[ing] asylum procedures in order to prevent backlogs” and
implementing a series of adaptations to prevent COVID-19 transmission and
ensure procedural fairness (such as using additional or alternative facilities with
sufcient spacing or adopting remote interviewing modalities as alternatives to
face-to-face interviewing) or implementing “an explicit exemption for asylum
seekers” where “entry bans or border closures are implemented,” combined with
medical screenings and quarantine.8
Te use of executive powers to make sweeping changes to refugee admission
policies, without public consultation and parliamentary debate, is troubling and
unprecedented. Tese changes are particularly disturbing given the concerns
raised in recent litigation about the Safe Tird Country Agreement (STCA), which
is an international agreement between Canada and the United States. Te STCA
permits Canada to turn some asylum seekers back at the Canada–US border

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Kathleen Harris, “Canada to turn back asylum seekers, close border at midnight to stop
spread of COVID-19” CBC News (20 March 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
trudeau-covid19-coronavirus-medical-equipment-1.5504149> [perma.cc/4YBY-EUDZ].
Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of
Entry into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0185 (26 March
2020), para d, s 5(1), online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=38991&
lang=en> [perma.cc/GU4T-6U3J] [OIC, 2020-0185].
OIC, 2020-0263, supra note 3.
Ravi Jain, “Re: COVID-19 and Irregular Asylum Seekers” (15 May 2020) at 2, online (pdf ):
Canadian Bar Association <cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=79ac3210-5ee7-425c8ac9-81bcac4acc9f> [perma.cc/9HJG-8X8V].
UNHCR Bureau for Europe, “Practical Recommendations and Good Practice to Address
Concerns in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic” (9 April 2020) at 2, 8, online
(pdf ): <data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/75453> [perma.cc/DT5M-85BK]
[UNHCR Europe].
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because it has designated the US as a “safe” country for refugees.9 Te litigation,
which questioned the agreement’s constitutionality and whether the US is,
in fact, “safe” for refugees, was successful (as discussed in more detail below).10
Te Federal Court recently concluded that the STCA violates section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), though the efect of this
decision has been suspended for six months, and the federal government has
announced its intention to appeal this decision.11
Tis article begins by introducing the STCA and several of the controversies
which surround it. It will then detail how emergency powers were used to achieve
a de facto extension12 of the STCA across the entire land border, extending the
STCA’s application beyond the ports of entry where it previously applied. Te
article then discusses the surprising lack of consideration given to asylum seekers’
rights by the drafters of the Quarantine Act, the inconsistent rationales advanced
by the federal government for the de facto STCA extension, and how these policies
violate international law. Te article concludes that the de facto STCA extension
was not the only option available to the government to prevent the spread of
COVID-19. A better option would be to accept the Federal Court’s declaration
that the STCA is unconstitutional, to suspend the agreement immediately, and to
allow those seeking refugee protection to cross the border subject to the regular
rules for travellers, including mandatory quarantines, by revoking the provisions
relating to refugees in the orders in council used to close the border. Such an
approach would acknowledge mounting evidence that the US is not a safe
country for refugees and would protect public health without violating Canada’s
legal obligations to asylum seekers.

9. Please see Part I, below, for a detailed discussion of the STCA’s history and functioning.
10. See Part I(B), below.
11. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC
770 at para 162 [CCR v Canada 2020]; Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada to
appeal the Federal Court decision on the Safe Tird Country Agreement” (21 August 2020),
online: <www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2020/08/government-of-canadato-appeal-the-federal-court-decision-on-the-safe-third-country-agreement.html> [perma.
cc/6TX3-NPK5] [Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada to appeal”].
12. For a discussion of this terminology, please see note 35, below, and accompanying text.
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I. THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT
A. BACKGROUND

Te Refugee Convention requires signatories to protect individuals who arrive at
their borders and meet the refugee defnition.13 Regardless of how refugees travel
to the country, as a signatory, Canada cannot deport them to a country where
they will face persecution (doing so is known as “refoulement”).14
Safe Tird Country Agreements (STCAs) allow states to return asylum
seekers to countries which they have designated as “safe” instead of ofering
them protection (prompting some scholars to refer to STCAs as “loophole[s]
in international refugee law”).15 Te animating principle behind STCAs is that
refugees should seek protection in the frst “safe” country that they reach outside
of their country of origin: A “safe” country being one that respects prohibitions
against refoulement in the Refugee Convention and in the Convention Against
Torture (CAT).16
Te possibility of an STCA with the US frst gained prominence in Canada
in 1988, when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney introduced regulations intended
to make it more difcult for refugees “to enter Canada in the frst place.”17 Tese
reforms were criticized at that time as a plan to get the US “to do our dirty work
and send the refugees back home.”18

13. UNHCR, Note on International Protection, 44th session, UN Doc A/AC.96/815, August
1993 at para 11.
14. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 2545,
arts 31, 33, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS
150 [Refugee Convention].
15. Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship, Non-Citizenship and the Rule of Law” (2018) 69 UNBLJ 19
at 38 [Macklin, 2018]. See also Isaac A Binkovitz, “State Practice with Respect to the Safe
Tird Country Concept: Criteria for Determining Tat a State Ofers Efective Protection
for Asylum Seekers and Refugees” (2018) 50 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 581.
16. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art 33; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, art
3 (entered into force 26 June 1987); Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Refections
on the Canada-U.S. Safe Tird Country Agreement” (2005) 36 Colum HRLR 365 at 381
[Macklin, 2005].
17. Ninette Kelley & MJ Trebilcock, Te Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian
Immigration Policy, 2nd ed (University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 418.
18. Ibid at 419, 422.
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Although early eforts to secure an STCA with the US failed, it remained
a priority for subsequent governments.19 Prime Minister Jean Chrétien fnally
convinced the US to commit to working towards the agreement at the end of
2001 in exchange for increased cooperation on border security.20 Tis was viewed
by many as taking advantage of American security preoccupations in the wake of
the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks.21 Te agreement was signed in 2002,22 the
US was ofcially designated as a safe third country in October of 2004, and the
agreement went into force on 29 December 2004.23
Te STCA requires asylum seekers from other countries to make their refugee
claim in the frst of the two countries that they arrive.24 Accordingly, if an asylum
seeker frst passes through the US en route to Canada, when they arrive at a
Canadian land port of entry (POE), they will be returned to the US to make their
refugee claim. Tere are, however, a number of exceptions built into the STCA:
asylum seekers who have a close family member living in Canada with lawful
status, who are unaccompanied minors, or who arrived with a valid Canadian
visa or entry document or were not required to obtain one may make claims
in Canada.25 We will refer to these asylum seekers as “STCA exempt asylum
seekers” going forward.
Te STCA’s coming into force led to a “dramatic drop” in the number of
refugee claims made in Canada, including several thousand fewer claims made

19. Cara D Cutler, “Te U.S.-Canada Safe Tird Country Agreement: Slamming the Door on
Refugees” (2004) 11 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 121 at 124.
20. Howard Adelman, “Canadian Borders and Immigration Post 9/11” (2002) 36 Intl
Migration Rev 15 at 27.
21. Catherine Dauvergne, “Evaluating Canada’s New Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
in its Global Context” (2003) 41 Alta L Rev 725 at 738; Reg Whitaker, “Refugee Policy
after September 11: Not Much New” (2002) 20 Refuge 29 at 32; Macklin, 2005, supra
note 16 at 371.
22. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America For cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third
countries, United States and Canada, 5 December 2002, Can TS 2004 No 2 (entered into
force 29 December 2004) [STCA].
23. Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 370, 376.
24. STCA, supra note 22 at arts 1(1)(a), 4(1).
25. Ibid at art 4(2).
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at Canadian POEs.26 However, these numbers “only tell part of the story.”27 Te
decrease in overall numbers was accompanied by an increase in border crossings
between POEs28 after 2004,29 as many scholars anticipated.30 Because many
asylum seekers could no longer “simply present themselves” at designated POEs
to claim refugee protection “in an orderly, efcient, and safe manner,”31 they
were forced to rely on the STCA’s limited applicability to refugee claims made at
POEs.32 Te STCA allows Canada and the US to return asylum seekers to their
“country of last presence,” defned as the country “in which the refugee claimant
was physically present immediately prior to making a refugee status claim at a
land border port of entry.”33 Accordingly, when an asylum seeker crosses from the
US to Canada between POEs, “Canada is her country of last presence under the
STCA,” and she may advance an inland claim for refugee protection.34
While some refer to the non-application of the STCA between POEs as a
“loophole,” it is better understood as an intentional feature of the agreement,

26. Canadian Council for Refugees, “Closing the Front Door on Refugees: Report on the
First Year of the Safe Tird Country Agreement” (December 2005) at 3-5, online (pdf ):
<ccrweb.ca/en/closing-front-door-refugees-report-frst-year-safe-third-country-agreement>
[perma.cc/Q47L-B975].
27. For further discussion, see Efrat Arbel, “Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of Rights:
Examining the Safe Tird County Agreement between Canada and the United States” (2013)
25 Intl J Refugee L 65 at 71-73.
28. Crossing into Canada “between POEs” refers to crossing into Canada from the United
States by land at any place other than those entry points which have been designated as
POEs by the Canadian government. Whereas previously POEs were listed in a schedule to
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR), due to recent changes, discussed
below, a POE is now simply defned as “a place designated by the Minister” of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2016-37, s 2; Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2020-55,
s 2 [IRPR].
29. For a detailed discussion of how the STCA made the border “more dangerous and disorderly,”
see Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, “Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the
Politics of Refugee Exclusion” (Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program,
November 2013) at 98-102.
30. Emily Carasco, “Canada-United States Safe Tird Country Agreement: To What Purpose”
(2003) 41 Can YB Intl Law 305 at 339; Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 398.
31. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 38.
32. STCA, supra note 22, arts 1(1)(a), 4(1).
33. Ibid, art 1(1)(a).
34. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 37.
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or as a “safety valve.”35 Te Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR)
explicitly state that the provisions in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(IRPA) which prevent claimants arriving from the US from making refugee
claims36 do “not apply to a claimant who seeks to enter Canada at a location that
is not a port of entry.”37 Tis aspect of the STCA was discussed “at some length”
by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
(the 2002 Standing Committee) prior to the STCA’s implementation.38 Te
Committee specifcally recommended against extending the agreement across the
entire land border based on evidence that Germany’s STCAs had “[led] people
to enter the country surreptitiously.”39 Te Committee feared that if the STCA
applied across the entire land border it would “have an adverse efect on security
and public health in Canada.”40 Ultimately, the Committee recommended that
the government “suspend or terminate” the STCA if “an increase in the number
of illegal entries to Canada” became apparent.41
Although for many years crossings between POEs were not a major political
issue in Canada,42 that changed with a “surge in asylum flings” in 2017.43 Tat

35. For this reason, in this article we will not refer to the government’s recent actions which
efectively extend the STCA’s application across the entire land border as closing a “loophole”
but, instead, as “the de facto STCA extension.” See ibid at 35-38; Craig Damian Smith,
“Changing U.S. Policy and Safe-Tird Country ‘Loophole’ Drive Irregular Migration to
Canada” (16 October 2019), online: Migration Policy Institute <www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/us-policy-safe-third-country-loophole-drive-irregular-migration-canada> [perma.
cc/RW4M-XGUC].
36. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 101(1)(e) [IRPA].
37. IRPR, supra note 28, s 159.4(1)(a). See also Statutory Instruments 2004 138/22, (2004) C
Gaz II, 1624, online (pdf ): Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/gazette/archives/
p2/2004/2004-11-03/pdf/g2-13822.pdf> [perma.cc/ZQ6H-KFMS].
38. Canada, Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, Te Safe Tird Country
Regulations: Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (Standing
Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, 2002) (Chair: Joe Fontana) at 10 [Standing
Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, 2002].
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid; STCA, supra note 22, art 10(2)-(4).
42. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 41.
43. Smith, supra note 35.
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year, the RCMP intercepted 20,593 asylum seekers between ofcial POEs.44 Tis
surge has been ascribed partly to policy changes making the US “less hospitable”
for migrants following the election of Donald Trump in 2016,45 including:
the “Muslim Travel Ban,”46 pushing back asylum seekers at the US–Mexico
border,47 separating children and parents in detention,48 increasing immigration
detention,49 and rendering many asylum seekers feeing gender-based persecution
or gang violence ineligible for protection, amongst others.50
It is important to note that the vast majority of these crossings between
POEs were not clandestine. Most asylum seekers entering the country in this way
“want[ed] to get caught,” and typically crossed the border openly at well-monitored
locations between POEs, such as at Roxham Road.51 Upon entry, they indicated
their intention to claim refugee protection and were allowed to do so as inland
claimants.52 Tese entry points had essentially become unofcial POEs. Tey
were considered well-managed due to standardized procedures, permanent

44. Tese numbers decreased to 19,419 in 2018 and to 16,503 in 2019. As of 31 August
2020, 3,143 migrants are reported as having been intercepted by the RCMP in 2020.
See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Asylum claims by year” (18 August
2020), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/
asylum-claims.html> [perma.cc/2TSK-Q3T8] [IRCC, Asylum claims by year]. See also
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Irregular border crosser statistics” (22 May
2020), online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/statistics/Pages/Irregular-border-crosser-statistics.aspx>
[perma.cc/EJ44-DTZX].
45. Smith, supra note 35.
46. See generally Ryan M Mardini, “Te Muslim Ban and the Constitutional Crisis” (2019) 96
U Det Mercy L Rev 225.
47. See generally Amnesty International, “USA: ’You Don’t Have Any Rights Here’” (2018),
online (pdf ): <www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5191012018ENGLISH.PDF>
[perma.cc/78FM-W95J].
48. UN News, “UN rights chief slams ‘unconscionable’ US border policy of separating migrant
children from parents” (18 June 2018), online: <news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1012382>
[perma.cc/EC68-HJ48].
49. Donald J Trump, “Executive Order 13767: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements” (25 January 2017), s 11(d), online: <www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/executive-order-border-security-immigration-enforcement-improvements>
[perma.cc/R3AB-EZWG].
50. See generally Caroline Holliday, “Making Domestic Violence Private Again: Referral
Authority and Rights Rollback in Matter of A-B-” (2019) 60 Boston College L Rev 2145.
51. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 29, 41.
52. Ibid at 46.
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infrastructure, and “routinized security screening and frst-line admissibility
checks” by the RCMP and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).53
Te STCA is controversial for many reasons, but we will focus on two
questions that have been particularly contentious in recent years. First, whether
the US can be considered a safe country for refugees. Second, how to address the
rise of entries between POEs.
B. IS THE US SAFE FOR REFUGEES?

Te Canadian Governor-in-Council’s (GIC) designation of the US as a “safe third
country” has been contested for years.54 In 2007, the Federal Court concluded
that the US was not safe for refugees, and that returning asylum seekers to the
US unjustifably breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by exposing them to
a risk of persecution or torture.55 However, the decision was overturned by the
Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) for procedural reasons, including that the parties
in the litigation lacked standing.56
Following President Trump’s election, new litigation regarding the STCA
was launched, with litigants carefully chosen to avoid the procedural problems
encountered previously.57 Te parties included refugee claimants who were
ineligible to seek asylum in Canada because of the STCA: a Salvadoran woman
and her children who were previously detained in the US and who sought asylum
on the basis of gang and gender-based persecution, a Syrian family who left the
US when the Muslim Travel Ban was issued by the US government, and an
Ethiopian woman who was held in detention in the US for a month after she was
denied entry to Canada.58
53. It is important to note that despite RCMP and CBSA presence, entering Canada at Roxham
Road qualifes as entering Canada “between POEs.” Although Roxham Road was “the site of
a former designated port of entry that closed several years ago,” it has not been re-designated
as a POE since. Te Canadian government has refrained from designating these sites as
POEs, presumably because doing so would simply lead asylum seekers to cross at less
well-monitored locations. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 29, 41; Smith, supra note 35.
54. IRPA, supra note 36, s 102(1).
55. Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2007 FC 1262 at paras 51, 240, 338.
56. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2008 FCA 229 at paras 98-103, leave to appeal to
SCC refused, 32820 (5 February 2009). For a detailed discussion of this litigation, see Arbel,
supra note 27 at 78-84.
57. For a discussion of these problems, see ibid at 81-84; Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 40-41;
Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2018 FC 829 at para 5.
58. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC
770 (CanLII) (Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras 37-43) (on fle
with the authors).
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Te applicants challenged the provisions of the IRPA which designated the
US as a safe third country59 and which render claimants travelling from the US
ineligible to have their refugee claims considered in Canada on several grounds.60
Teir arguments focused on multiple “aspects of the U.S. asylum system that limit
the protection accessible to broad classes of refugees, exposing them to refoulement
in violation of the Refugee Convention.”61 Tey provided extensive evidence on
these aspects of the US refugee system, including on a policy called the “one year
bar” which imposes a higher risk standard than does the Refugee Convention for
claimants who do not make their claim within a year of arriving in the country,62
on policies which efectively place women feeing gender-based-persecution
“outside the refugee defnition,”63 on an “overly restrictive legal interpretation”
of the particular social group ground of asylum which increases the risk of
refoulement for “those feeing harm based on their sexual orientation, gender
identity, or gang targeting,”64 on the practice of criminally prosecuting “illegal”
entry into the US of asylum seekers,65 on the use of an “expedited removal process”
which denies many asylum seekers an opportunity to claim asylum,66 and on a
series of policies at the US–Mexico border which illegally pushes asylum seekers
back and/or forces them to wait in Mexico “for months or years” until their US
asylum hearing.67 Te applicants also provided extensive evidence on American
immigration detention conditions, including evidence about “the large-scale
detention of children and the mass separation of children and parents,”68 evidence
that asylum seekers “regularly remain detained throughout the asylum process,”69
evidence that being detained in this way “seriously impedes asylum-seekers’
ability to mount an asylum claim,”70 and evidence that detention conditions

59. IRPR, supra note 28, s 159.3.
60. IRPA, supra note 36, s 101(1)(e). Te applicants sought declarations that these provisions
were ultra vires, inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and
the CAT and in violation of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra
note 11 at para 28.
61. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 16.
62. Ibid at paras 32-36.
63. Ibid at para 37.
64. Ibid at para 42.
65. Ibid at para 44.
66. Ibid at para 47.
67. Ibid at paras 53-54.
68. Ibid at para 26.
69. Ibid at para 19.
70. Ibid at para 22.
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were “often inhumane, cruel and unusual.”71 We note that, because the case was
heard prior to the global pandemic, no evidence connected to COVID-19 was
before the court.
In July 2020, several months into the pandemic, the Federal Court released
its decision in the Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (CCR v Canada)
case. In its decision, the court was careful not to “pass judgement on the US
asylum system” or to engage in “a comparison” of Canadian and American
asylum systems.72 Te court rejected a line of arguments that focused on the
reasonableness of designating the US as a safe third country73 and declined to
address a line of arguments focused on the STCA’s disproportionate impact on
women.74 However, the court agreed with the applicants that the provisions
implementing the STCA violated constitutional rights to life, liberty, and security
of the person under section 7 of the Charter. Te court concluded these violations
could not be justifed in a free and democratic society under section 1.75
Te analysis in CCR v Canada was largely focused on the evidence with
respect to US detention conditions outlined above. Te court concluded that
“the immediate consequence to ineligible STCA claimants is that they will be
imprisoned solely for having attempted to make a refugee claim in Canada.”76
Te court’s analysis centred on the evidence of what befell one of the applicants,
71. Te conditions described by the applicants included “punitive conditions; Solitary
confnement; Inadequate and/or delayed medical care …; Staggering rates of sexual assault
and sexual harassment; Dangerous overcrowding; Cold temperatures; Inadequate/unsafe
food/water and lack of accommodation of religious dietary customs; Limited or no time
outdoors.” Ibid at para 24.
72. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at para 138.
73. Te applicants argued that the relevant provisions were ultra vires, or beyond the
government’s lawful authority. Te court concluded that it could not depart from the
“binding authority” of the Federal Court of Appeal’s (FCA) 2008 decision on this matter.
While the Federal Court concluded in 2007 that the STCA’s failure to comply with relevant
provisions of the Refugee Convention and the CAT was a condition precedent to the GIC’s
exercise of its delegated authority under s 102 of the IRPA, the FCA found that it was
“irrelevant” if the US “actually” complied with these conventions as long as the Canadian
government considered the factors set out in s 102(2) of the IRPA. For a detailed discussion
of these decisions, see Arbel, supra note 27 at 79-82. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at
paras 79-80.
74. Te applicants also argued that the STCA violates s 15 of the Charter “because it has a
disproportionate impact on women” due to US asylum law’s efective exclusion of asylum
claims founded on gender-based persecution. Te court declined to address this challenge in
light of its ruling with respect to section 7. For further discussion of the arguments advanced
with respect to s 15, see Part III(D). See CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at para 154.
75. Ibid at para 162.
76. Ibid at para 128.
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Ms. Mustefa. After trying to claim asylum in Canada and being found ineligible
because of the STCA, Ms. Mustefa was returned to the US by CBSA ofcers, was
then “immediately imprisoned,” held in solitary confnement for a week, lost
nearly ffteen pounds because she was being fed pork “despite telling the guards
she could not consume it for religious reasons,” and was “detained alongside
people who had criminal convictions.”77 Te court found that this evidence was
sufcient to “shock the conscience,” that it “clearly demonstrate[d] that those
returned to the US by Canadian ofcials are detained as a penalty” without
“regard for their circumstances, moral blameworthiness, or their actions,” and
that these actions were “not in keeping with the spirit or the intention of the
STCA or the foundational Conventions upon which it was built.”78 Te court
concluded that the liberty rights in section 7 of the Charter were breached, that
“Canada cannot turn a blind eye to the consequences that befell Ms. Mustefa
in its eforts to adhere to the STCA,” and that “the risk of detention for the
sake of ‘administrative’ compliance with the provisions of the STCA cannot
be justifed.”79
Te court concluded by declaring the relevant provisions of the IRPA and the
IRPR to be of no force and efect but suspended the efect of its decision for six
months to “allow time for Parliament to respond.”80
Te Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Bill Blair, has
recently announced that the federal government intends to appeal this decision,
citing unspecifed “factual and legal errors” in CCR v Canada and reiterating that
“people should claim asylum in the frst safe country in which they arrive.”81 Tis
issue will accordingly remain live for at least some time. We will further address
several of the arguments considered in CCR v Canada below.
C. HOW SHOULD THE “SURGE” IN ENTRIES BETWEEN POES BE
ADDRESSED?

In addition to questions about the constitutionality of the STCA, there has also been
signifcant controversy about how to address the rise in asylum seekers supposedly
“illegally” entering Canada using the so-called “loophole” in the STCA.82

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Ibid at paras 92-96.
Ibid at paras 135-39.
Ibid at paras 103-15.
Ibid at paras 162-63.
Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada to appeal,” supra note 11.
For a discussion of why it is inaccurate to call entering between POEs a “loophole,” see notes
35 to 41 and accompanying text.
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Before examining that controversy, we wish to highlight that it is not
“illegal” for asylum seekers to enter Canada between ofcial POEs. International
law recognizes the right to seek asylum,83 and the Refugee Convention prohibits
signatories from imposing “penalties” on refugees who have entered “without
authorization.”84 Until recently, the only technically “illegal” act that an asylum
seeker made when crossing the border between ofcial POEs was their failure to
declare imported goods.85
In response to the 2017 “surge” described above, many have called for the
STCA’s suspension.86 Some have specifcally questioned why the government did
not “heed the recommendation” of the 2002 Standing Committee to suspend
the agreement once “an increase in the number of illegal entries to Canada” had
become apparent.87
At the same time, members of the Conservative Party objecting to “illegal
border crossers” from the US88 have sought to declare the entire land border
with the US a POE, thus unilaterally expanding the STCA.89 It is difcult to
understand how this could have been implemented. While either country may
terminate or suspend the STCA unilaterally, any modifcations or additions
must be agreed to in writing.90 Without the US’s consent to return these asylum
seekers, the US could—and likely would—simply refuse to re-admit them.
83. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No
13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71, art 14. For further discussion, see Jane McAdam & Kate
Purcell, “Refugee Protection in the Howard Years: Obstructing the Right to Seek Asylum”
(2008) 27 Australian YB of Intl L 87 at 90-92.
84. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art 31.
85. Changes to be discussed in detail in Part III(G), below. See Macklin, 2018, supra note 15
at 31, 46-47.
86. Te Canadian Press, “Quebec should have power over Ottawa in refugee settlement:
Bloc Quebecois leader,” Global News (23 September 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/
news/5940238/bloc-quebecois-leader-calls-for-suspension-of-safe-third-country-agreement>
[perma.cc/A3AR-LRAN]; Jenny Kwan, “NDP Statement on Safe Tird Country Agreement”
(15 March 2019), online: NDP <www.ndp.ca/news/ndp-statement-safe-third-countryagreement> [perma.cc/FP25-TAUR].
87. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 43; Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship,
2002, supra note 38 at 10.
88. Conservative Party of Canada, “A new Conservative government will close the loophole
in the Safe Tird Country Agreement” (9 October 2019), online: <www.conservative.
ca/a-new-conservative-government-will-close-the-loophole-in-the-safe-third-countryagreement> [perma.cc/QCP5-U36J].
89. Brian Hill, “Experts say Scheer’s plan to close border loophole ‘doomed to failure,’” Global
News (9 October 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6011333/scheer-plan-borderloophoole-doomed-to-failure-experts> [perma.cc/UBB7-DBHR].
90. STCA, supra note 22 at art 10, s 2-4.
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Ultimately, the Liberal government chose to neither suspend nor unilaterally
expand the STCA. Instead, the Prime Minister’s most recent mandate letter of
the IRCC Minister included a commitment to “work with the United States
to modernize” the STCA.91 Although the current IRCC Minister refused to
confrm whether “modernize” meant “that the government is looking for ways
to extend and expand” the STCA,92 and the former IRCC Minister indicated
that there was “no need to tinker” with the STCA,93 it is clear that eforts have
long been underway to “review” the agreement with the US.94 Indeed, Minister
Blair has indicated that Canada was “hoping to address” the “exemption” in the
STCA allowing people “to avoid its terms” in “ongoing discussions” with the
US.95 However, little progress was made on this front.96 Tis is unsurprising.
Te Trump administration has little interest in preventing asylum seekers from
leaving the US for Canada.

II. THE DE FACTO EXTENSION OF THE STCA ACROSS THE
ENTIRE LAND BORDER
Despite American reluctance, the goal of negotiating away the STCA “exemption”
has nonetheless been temporarily achieved during the COVID-19 crisis. Media
reports suggest that the US has agreed to the de facto STCA extension during the

91. Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Mandate Letter”
(13 December 2019), online: Ofce of the Prime Minister <pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/
2019/12/13/minister-immigration-refugees-and-citizenship-mandate-letter>.
92. Te Minister answered that modernize “means to continually reassess this agreement.” House
of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence, 43-1, No 5 (12 March 2020) at 6, online: Our Commons <www.ourcommons.
ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-1/CIMM/meeting-5/minutes> [perma.cc/F7TV-DPML].
93. Brenna Rose, “Safe Tird Country Agreement to stay, pledges immigration minister,”
CBC News (29 March 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/
safe-third-country-agreement-to-stay-pledges-immigration-minister-1.4046998>.
94. Rachel Aiello, “Border security minister engages U.S. in formal Safe Tird Country talks,”
CTV News (23 September 2018), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/politics/border-security-ministerengages-u-s-in-formal-safe-third-country-talks-1.4104602> [perma.cc/DEW7-TAPY].
95. Teresa Wright, “Blair mulling ways to close loophole in Safe Tird Country Agreement,”
National Observer (17 March 2019), online: <www.nationalobserver.com/2019/03/17/news/
blair-mulling-ways-close-loophole-safe-third-country-agreement> [perma.cc/CX66-4F3H].
96. Amanda Connolly, “U.S. inches closer to allowing talks to amend Safe Tird Country
Agreement,” Global News (1 April 2019), online <globalnews.ca/news/5119022/
safe-third-country-agreement-amend-united-states> [perma.cc/9VYY-RW4J].

720

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

global pandemic.97 Te extension will likely remain in efect until all appeals of
CCR v Canada are concluded.
Unfortunately, despite pressure from activists, the government has refused
to make agreements or negotiations with the US on these matters public.98 Teir
efects can nonetheless be tracked through a series of Orders in Council (OICs)
released by the GIC pursuant to the Quarantine Act to prevent “non-essential”
foreign nationals from entering Canada.99
A. ORDERS IN COUNCIL AND ALTERED REGULATIONS

Te frst OIC, issued on 20 March 2020, prohibited most foreign nationals from
entering Canada from the US “for the purpose of making a claim for refugee
protection,” both at and between POEs.100 Tis broad ban on asylum seekers’
entry continued through subsequent OICs.101 Ten, on 20 April 2020, the
government once again permitted asylum seekers who met STCA exemptions
to seek asylum at ofcial POEs, but introduced sweeping measures prohibiting
most foreign nationals from entering Canada through the US “for the purpose
of making a claim for refugee protection unless” they specifcally sought “to
enter Canada at a land [POE] designated by the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness.”102
Tis OIC activated three relevant sections of the IRPR which were amended
a month earlier to authorize the CBSA “to operationalize the prohibitions” made
in all subsequent OICs pursuant to the Quarantine Act or the Emergencies Act.103
97. Brooklyn Neustaeter, “Canada-U.S. border to remain closed to non-essential travel for
another month,” CTV News (16 June 2020), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/health/coronavirus/
canada-u-s-border-to-remain-closed-to-non-essential-travel-for-another-month-1.4986310>.
98. Nicholas Keung, “Ottawa should reveal details of border ban,” Toronto Star (11 May
2020), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2020/05/11/ottawa-should-reveal-details-ofborder-ban-on-irregular-migrants-refugee-advocates-say.html> [perma.cc/YK33-KJMP]
[Keung, “Border Ban”].
99. Quarantine Act, SC 2005, c 20, s 58 [Quarantine Act].
100. OIC, 2020-0161, supra note 2, s 4(1).
101. OIC, 2020-0185, supra note 5, s 5(1).
102. OIC, 2020-0263, supra note 3, s 5(1). Tese same measures have been replicated in
subsequent orders, including the most recent OIC, efective until 21 September 2020.
Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of Entry
into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0565 (20 August 2020),
s 5(1), online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=39536&lang=en>
[perma.cc/666U-9ZA4].
103. IRPR, supra note 28; Statutory Instruments 2020 154/8, (2020) C Gaz II, 554-55, online:
Government of Canada <canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2020/2020-04-15/pdf/g2-15408.
pdf> [Canada Gazette, 2020].
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First, part of the defnition of a POE was repealed so that it was now simply
defned as “a place designated by the Minister” as a POE.104 Secondly, the
Minister was granted full discretion to designate POEs in response to new OICs
issued pursuant to the Quarantine Act or the Emergencies Act.105 Finally, foreign
nationals “prohibited from entering Canada by” one of these OICs were added to
the list of those who CBSA ofcers could “direct back” to the US.106
Previously, IRCC guidance indicated that CBSA ofcers could only
temporarily direct refugee claimants back to the US “under exceptional
circumstances” and only after making “[a]ll eforts” to process them at the
time of arrival.107 In those circumstances, ofcers were required to schedule
an appointment within three working days and to seek “assurances from”
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that the claimant would be made
available to return for their appointment.108
Te changes to the direct back provisions signifcantly expand their potential
use and application. According to a recent CBSA Operational Bulletin, all foreign
nationals not falling under one of the prescribed exemptions to the OICs are to
be directed back to the US “until the order is lifted.”109 Te Bulletin indicates that
those who comply with the direct backs will be allowed to “return to the border
to seek entry after the prohibitions have been lifted,”110 but that those who fail
to comply or who attempt to re-enter before the OICs are lifted “after being
directed back” will be rendered inadmissible to Canada for non-compliance
with the IRPA.111 Asylum seekers entering the country between POEs appear to
be caught by this policy;112 the bulletin specifcally mentions foreign nationals
“intercepted between” POEs amongst those to be directed back to the US.113
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

113.

See discussion above at note 28. See also Canada Gazette, 2020, supra note 103 at 556.
IRPR, supra note 28, s 26(f ).
Ibid, s 41(d).
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “ENF 4 Port of Entry Examinations” (15
August 2019) at 98, online (pdf ): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/
resources/manuals/enf/enf04-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/SV3S-RKNX].
Ibid at 99.
Canada Border Services Agency, Regulatory Amendments to Implement Travel Prohibitions in
Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, (Operational Bulletin), OBO-2020-021 (21 March 2020)
at 2 [CBSA, OBO-2020-021].
Ibid at 4.
Ibid.
Please note that we cannot speak defnitively—we are aware of a separate bulletin which
apparently provides instructions for ofcers dealing with all “foreign nationals who make a
claim for refugee protection.” Tis bulletin has not been made publicly available. We have
made an Access to Information Request in hopes of obtaining it. Ibid at 3.
Ibid at 4.
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Taken together, the three changes to the IRPR outlined above efectively
ensure that designated POEs are the only places where asylum seekers may
currently enter the country. Similarly, the relevant OICs ensure that only STCA
exempt asylum seekers will be admitted at designated POEs. Tis means that
the STCA is currently being enforced in a manner that is even more restrictive
than when the Federal Court heard evidence which led the court to declare the
agreement unconstitutional.
As discussed above, closing the Canada–US border to asylum seekers
entering between POEs can only be achieved with the US’s consent. Although
the terms of the current arrangements with the US are not publicly known,
Canada has achieved its objective of ending border crossings between POEs,
at least temporarily, by leveraging the COVID-19 crisis to surmount apparent
US reluctance. Te result is that the Canadian government has efectively barred
most refugee claimants from entering Canada.114
It is worth noting the striking parallels between the present moment and the
moment which initially motivated the US to sign the STCA. Just as the Canadian
government took advantage of American preoccupations with national security
after 9/11 to convince the US to agree to the STCA in 2001, today Canada has
leveraged a global pandemic to persuade the US to (at least temporarily) agree to
the de facto extension of the STCA.115
Perhaps we should not be surprised. Pandemic planning has long invoked
analogies “between contagious disease and terrorism; between the individual
carrier of disease and the terrorist intent on destruction.”116 As Janet Mosher has
observed, “[b]oth are depicted as threats to national security, and best managed
through surveillance, borders, containment, and control.”117
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE QUARANTINE ACT

Te use of the Quarantine Act to close the border to most refugees raises the
question: do these actions align with the purposes of the Act?

114. For details of how other refugees have been blocked from coming to Canada, including some
resettled refugees, see Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Coronavirus disease
(COVID-19): Refugees, asylum complaints, sponsors and PRRA applicants” (25 May 2020),
online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/coronavirus-covid19/
refugees.html#resettlement> [perma.cc/T3MF-79RW].
115. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text, above. See also Cutler, supra note 19 at 125.
116. Janet E Mosher, “Accessing Justice amid Treats of Contagion” (2014) 51 Osgoode
Hall LJ 919 at 921.
117. Ibid.
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Te power to prohibit classes of persons from entering Canada in response
to public health risks was introduced following the 2003 SARS outbreak. Te
Minister of Health introduced a revised Quarantine Act in 2005 empowering
the GIC to prohibit “any class of persons” from entering Canada if “the entry of
members of that class of persons” might “introduce or contribute to the spread
of ” a communicable disease and “no reasonable alternatives” were available to
prevent such a spread.118
Te drafters of the Act do not appear to have discussed the impact of such
a closure on asylum seekers in committee or parliamentary debates. Te only
mention of refugees in these discussions was an assertion about the need for
“clarity around whether this Act will be paramount to” the IRPA.119 Tere appears
to have been no consideration of what “reasonable alternatives to prevent the
introduction or spread of the disease” needed to be considered before excluding
a whole class of people from the country.
However, the drafters did speak of wanting to strike the “proper balance
between the need to protect public health and the need to protect human
rights.”120 Tey took pains to ensure that those enforcing the Act would “always
choose the least intrusive measure” available.121 We may therefore conclude that
the drafters assumed that this “extreme measure” would only be implemented if
it struck the proper balance between the human rights of those being excluded
and the need to protect public health.122 In our view, the de facto STCA extension
has not achieved this balance.

118. Nola M Ries, “Quarantine and the Law: Te 2003 SARS Experience in Canada (A New
Disease Calls on Old Public Health Tools)” (2005) 43 Alta L Rev 529 at 535; Quarantine
Act, supra note 99, s 58.
119. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Evidence, 38-1, No 9 (23 November
2004) 1 at 2, online (pdf ): OurCommons <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/381/
HESA/Evidence/EV1498032/HESAEV09-E.PDF> [perma.cc/V6CS-U2UY].
120. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Evidence, 38-1, No 6 (4 November
2004) at 6, online (pdf ): OurCommons <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/381/
HESA/Evidence/EV1460081/HESAEV06-E.PDF> [perma.cc/6KB3-SD7D].
121. Ibid at 6.
122. Ries, supra note 118 at 535.
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C. IMPACT OF THE DE FACTO STCA EXTENSION TO DATE

Between 21 March and 12 May 2020, twenty-six asylum seekers were directed
back to the US after attempting to enter Canada between POEs.123 For context,
the RCMP intercepted 1,246 asylum seekers in April of 2019, and 1,196 in May
of 2019.124 Tese numbers indicate that either fewer asylum seekers are entering
from the US during COVID-19, or, as the 2002 Standing Committee feared,
that more asylum seekers are simply avoiding detection upon entry.
Like many refugee advocates, we fear that Canada’s emergency measures may
lead to the refoulement of asylum seekers, in violation of international law.125
It remains unclear whether the US has committed not to deport returned asylum
seekers, but some American ofcials have indicated that they “will immediately”
deport “illegal aliens.”126 Further, as discussed briefy in Part I(B), above, the
Federal Court confrmed in CCR v Canada that “the immediate consequence
to ineligible STCA claimants” of being denied entry to Canada is “that they will
be imprisoned solely for having attempted to make a refugee claim in Canada,”
and that this detention takes place “without regard to their circumstances, moral
blameworthiness, or their actions.”127 Te Federal Court also characterized
detention conditions as “cruel and usual,” even without considering evidence of

123. Daniel Renaud, “Le nombre de demandeurs d’asile en chute libre,” La Presse (13 May 2020),
online: <www.lapresse.ca/covid-19/202005/12/01-5273336-le-nombre-de-demandeursdasile-en-chute-libre.php> [perma.cc/ZP2B-QS23]. See also Stephanie Levitz, “CBSA says it
turned back 21 asylum seekers who tried to cross from U.S. in May,” Te Globe and Mail (29
June 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-cbsa-says-it-turned-back-21asylum-seekers-who-tried-to-cross-from-us> [perma.cc/W88Y-HJNV].
124. IRCC, Asylum claims by year, supra note 44.
125. Keung, “Border Ban,” supra note 98.
126. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: DHS Measures on the Border to Limit the
Further Spread of Coronavirus” (23 March 2020), online: <www.dhs.gov/news/2020/05/20/
fact-sheet-dhs-measures-border-limit-further-spread-coronavirus> [perma.cc/MB7W-XZAF]
[DHS]. See also Reuters, “Asylum-seekers turned back by Canada at its border will be
shipped home, U.S. says,” National Post (27 March 2020), online: <nationalpost.com/news/
canada/u-s-to-return-canada-bound-asylum-seekers-stopped-at-border-to-home-nations>
[perma.cc/PW46-BFP6].
127. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 128, 135.
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heightened risks during COVID-19.128 In our view, the American response to the
pandemic has only amplifed the concerns that led the Federal Court to fnd the
STCA unconstitutional.

III. SOME OF THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS WITH THE DE
FACTO EXTENSION OF THE STCA
We acknowledge that responsible governments must “take legitimate measures
to prevent the spread of the virus.”129 In a similar acknowledgment, the UNHCR
issued two documents which provide guidance on how states can achieve “an
efective response to the pandemic while at the same time respecting international
refugee law and standards.”130 Te frst outlines “key legal considerations, based on
international refugee and human rights law” which states should consider if they
“restrict the entry of non-nationals for the protection of public health in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic.”131 Te second, issued by the UNHCR’s Regional
Bureau for Europe, provided governments with “a set of practical considerations
and concrete advice to enable an efective response to the pandemic while at the
same time respecting international refugee law and standards.”132
In our view, the measures adopted by the Canadian government fail to respect
the international standards refected in these documents in four key respects: (1)
they appear to penalize asylum seekers for “illegal” entry; (2) they are not clearly
“necessary for the legitimate purpose of managing the identifed health risk”;133
(3) they do not provide any mechanism for making “independent inquiries”

128. Ibid at para 136. See generally Amnesty International, “USA: ‘We are Adrift, About to
Sink’: Te Looming COVID-19 Disaster in the United States Immigration Detention
Facilities” (April 2020), online (pdf ): <www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
AMR5120952020english.pdf> [perma.cc/R3R6-9EJ7]; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, “ICE Detainee Statistics” (5 June 2020), online: <www.ice.gov/coronavirus>
[perma.cc/BZ4A-WK5E]; Patricia Sulbarán Lovera, “Coronavirus: Immigration detention
centres in crisis,” BBC News (1 May 2020), online: <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada52476131> [perma.cc/T55A-5J97].
129. UNHCR Europe, supra note 8 at 1.
130. Ibid.
131. UNHCR, “Key Legal Considerations on access to territory for persons in need of
international protection in the context of the COVID-19 response” (16 March 2020) at
para 5, online: <data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75349> [perma.cc/BC7B-X2GH]
[UNHCR, COVID-19].
132. UNHCR Europe, supra note 8 at 1.
133. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 7.
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to ensure that persons arriving at their borders “are not at risk of refoulement”;134
and (4) they do not abide by the requirement that “measures to ascertain and
manage risks to public health … must be non-discriminatory,”135 as they will
likely amplify the STCA’s disproportionate impact on female asylum seekers,
particularly those feeing gender-based persecution.
A. DO THE MEASURES PENALIZE ASYLUM SEEKERS FOR THEIR METHOD
OF ENTRY?

Our frst concern with the de facto STCA extension is that it penalizes asylum
seekers for entering the country irregularly. CBSA directives reveal that asylum
seekers who enter the country between POEs may be charged by the RCMP
with “non-compliance with the Quarantine Act prohibition on non-essential
travel” (which carries a fne of up to $750,000 and/or imprisonment for up to six
months), or may be directed back to the US by the CBSA.136 Tis is a dramatic
departure from previous Canadian practice, where the only thing “illegal” about
these crossings was a minor breach of the Customs Act.137
Tese changes appear to contravene article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention,
which prohibits state parties from “impos[ing] penalties, on account of their
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who … enter or are present in their territory
without authorization.”138 Tese prohibitions are refected in the IRPA: Section
133 prevents refugees and refugee claimants from being charged for certain
crimes “in relation to [their] coming into Canada.”139 However, these protections
are limited to select ofences under the IRPA and the Criminal Code of Canada.140
Te government’s failure to include the new Quarantine Act ofences under this
provision’s protection means that asylum seekers could face fnes or imprisonment
for coming into Canada to claim refugee protection.
Even if asylum seekers are not charged, directing them back to the US for
breaching the Quarantine Act is itself a penalty. Te Supreme Court of Canada

134. Ibid at para 3.
135. Ibid at para 5.
136. CBSA, OBO-2020-021, supra note 109 at 2, 4-5; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “News
Release: RCMP role in enforcing the Federal Quarantine Act” (10 April 2020), online:
<www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2020/rcmp-role-enforcing-the-federal-quarantine-act>
[perma.cc/ZK96-4494]; Quarantine Act, supra note 99, s 71.
137. See Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 46-48.
138. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art 31(1).
139. Uppal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 338 at para 21.
140. IRPA, supra note 36, s 133.
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has confrmed that article 31 does not apply “only to criminal penalties.”141
International refugee law expert James Hathaway has described a US practice
of placing some asylum seekers who arrive irregularly into expedited removal
processes with reduced procedural rights as “a penalty inficted for irregular
entry” because the procedure is designed “to sanction a refugee for his or her
mode of entry.”142 Te OICs and the changes to the IRPR should similarly be
understood as “penalties” which violate the Refugee Convention; they efectively
prevent claimants from accessing regular refugee claim procedures as punishment
for violating the Quarantine Act.
B. ARE THE MEASURES STRICTLY NECESSARY?

Secondly, several international instruments provide guidance on when and how
border closures should be implemented in the context of public health crises.
As a signatory to the International Health Regulations (IHR), Canada was required
to provide the World Health Organization (WHO) with a public health rationale
supported by scientifc evidence before implementing measures that interfered
with international trafc.143 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) requires “clear and convincing evidence that the person
whose rights are to be curtailed … poses a demonstrable threat to others; that the
burden is proportionate to the expected beneft … and that the measure is applied
in a non-discriminatory manner.”144 Te UNHCR reiterated these requirements,
indicating that “measures to ascertain and manage risks to public health” must
be “non-discriminatory as well as necessary, proportionate, and reasonable to
the aim of protecting public health.”145 Te Canadian government has failed to
publicly ofer a clear and consistent rationale explaining why the de facto STCA
extension is an efective means of protecting public health or that it has met the
obligations outlined above.
Tree days before the de facto STCA extension was implemented, Minister
Blair indicated that asylum seekers would continue to be allowed into the country,
but that they would be screened for symptoms and isolated for fourteen days.146
141. B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at para 63.
142. James C Hathaway, Te Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2005) at 408.
143. World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, 2nd (WHO, 2005), art 43.3.
144. Mosher, supra note 116 at 932.
145. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 5.
146. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Ministers and Federal Health Ofcials Provide
COVID-19 Update” (17 March 2020) at 23m:23s, online: <www.cpac.ca/en/programs/
covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66171692> [perma.cc/258L-92V9].
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Tis initial plan would have aligned with the UNHCR’s recommendations that
states manage the arrival of asylum-seekers in a safe manner by implementing “an
explicit exemption for asylum seekers” where “entry bans or border closures are
implemented,” alongside quarantine and medical screening or testing practices.147
As discussed above, the government changed course dramatically only a
few days later, initially banning the entry of all asylum seekers and subsequently
carving out exceptions exclusively for STCA exempt asylum seekers. Federal
ofcials have advanced conficting rationales for the subsequent change of policy.
Policy documents indicate that the measures were introduced to prevent the
entry of those who “may pose a health and safety risk to Canada.”148 Although
Minister Blair has acknowledged that asylum seekers “do not represent a higher
public health risk,” he has also said that the expansion is intended “to keep
people safe”149 and to “ensure the safety of Canadians.”150 Similarly, the Prime
Minister has stated that the changes were “not at all” due to a lack of space
or resources,151 but Minister Blair insisted they were necessary to “manage and
regulate non-essential passage” at the border.152
Whatever the true rationale, the measures taken perpetuate a troubling
history whereby refugees “have been identifed as vectors of disease, scapegoated
… and banished.”153 As Mosher posits, the question of which laws are necessary
in the context of a pandemic “can only be answered by interrogating more closely
how the threat is conceptualized and who is understood to be threatened.”154
It is clear that asylum seekers have been presented as a threat to “the health of
Canadians,” but it is not clear why, particularly in light of evidence that migrants

147. UNHCR Europe, supra note 8 at 1-2.
148. Canada Gazette, 2020, supra note 103 at 555.
149. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Federal Ministers and Health Ofcials Provide
COVID-19 Update” (20 March 2020) at 1h:16m:30s, online (video): <www.cpac.ca/en/
programs/covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66172917> [perma.cc/FUP4-3JKP] [CPAC,
20 March 2020].
150. ParlVU, “Meeting No. 2 Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic” (29 Apr
2020) at 13h:28m, online (video): <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/
PowerBrowserV2/20200429/-1/33109?Language=English&Stream=Video> [perma.cc/
EQ34-9DJW] [COVID-19 Committee, Meeting 2].
151. CPAC, 20 March 2020, supra note 149 at 00h:01m:02s.
152. Ibid at 00h:09m:09s.
153. Mosher, supra note 116 at 936-37.
154. Ibid at 920-21.
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and refugees have “a low risk of transmitting communicable diseases to host
populations in general.”155
International organizations have warned that rather than protecting public
health, travel restrictions during pandemics can “be detrimental to disease
prevention eforts.”156 Indeed, the WHO has written that, although “border closure
may seem an attractive political option to prevent the spread of a communicable
disease across international land borders, evidence that closing a border is an
efective disease prevention measure is scant-to-nonexistent.”157 Rather than
preventing the spread of disease, the WHO writes that border closures “can have
the opposite efect of increasing the risk of spread by encouraging travellers to
take uncontrolled routes across the border.”158 Te WHO accordingly encourages
states to avoid border closures in favour of measures which “would achieve a
similar level of health protection.”159 Similarly, the UNHCR has argued that
precluding the admission of refugees or asylum-seekers “without evidence of
a health risk and without measures to protect against refoulement, would be
discriminatory and would not meet international standards.”160
Given these warnings and the government’s failure to provide a reasonable
or consistent rationale for targeting asylum-seekers entering between POEs,
we believe that the de facto STCA extension is not truly about protecting the
health and safety of Canadians. It is, instead, about the government’s desire “to
counter charges of not protecting the population from disease.”161
155. ParlVU, “Meeting No. 16 Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic” (3 Jun 2020) at
13h:57m, online (video): <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/
20200603/-1/33341?Language=English&Stream=Video> [perma.cc/8MT6-6X9G]; Hans
Henri P Kluge et al, “Refugee and migrant health in the COVID-19 response” (2020) 395
Te Lancet 1237 at 1238.
156. Ali Tejpar & Steven J Hofman, “Canada’s Violation of International Law during the
2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak” (2016) 54 Can YB Intl Law 366 at 371. See also Sharmila
Devi, “Travel Restrictions Hampering COVID-19 Response” (2020) 395 Te Lancet 1331.
157. World Health Organization, Handbook for public health capacity-building at ground crossings
and cross-border collaboration, (2020) at 28, online (pdf ): <apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
handle/10665/331534/9789240000292-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/TQR5-JPH9].
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid. For a detailed discussion of the ways in which “[m]any of the travel restrictions being
implemented during the COVID-19 outbreak are not supported by science or WHO,”
see Roojin Habibi et al, “Do not violate the International Health Regulations during the
COVID-19 outbreak” (2020) 395 Te Lancet 664.
160. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 6.
161. Catherine Z Worsnop, “Domestic politics and the WHO’s International Health Regulations:
Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks” (2017) 12 Rev Intl
Organizations 365 at 366.
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Unfortunately, prominent members of the Conservative Party have levelled
charges focused on the supposed risks posed by asylum-seekers. For example,
Peter MacKay criticized the Prime Minister for “allowing illegal border crossings”
when the country may not have “enough equipment for our own citizens.”162
Similarly, Erin O’Toole, the newly elected leader of the Conservative Party,
argued that “the resumption of illegal passage” would be “against the health of
the Canadian public.”163 Travel restrictions are often implemented in response to
this type of criticism “because they can quell public fear and instill confdence in
the government.”164
To see that the de facto STCA extension is more about political signalling
than public health, one needs only to consider what travel has (and has not) been
deemed “essential” during the pandemic. For example, the Canadian government
supported the National Hockey League’s resumption of the 2019–2020 season
in Canadian “hub cities.”165 International travel by hockey players, coaches, and
support staf has therefore been characterized as essential, while travelling to the
country between POEs to seek asylum has not been. Similarly, it is unclear why
it was deemed essential for Americans to travel to Alaska through Canada166
while travelling to Canada to attend the birth of one’s child was not.167 Many of

162. Emerald Bensadoun, “Coronavirus: Asylum seekers irregularly crossing to Canada will
be screened,” Global News (17 March 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6689836/
asylum-seekers-canada-coronavirus> [perma.cc/RQJ6-XG9A].
163. COVID-19 Committee, Meeting 2, supra note 150 at 13h:28m; Alex Boutilier, “Erin
O’Toole wins Conservative Party leadership in major upset,” Toronto Star (23 August 2020),
online: <www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2020/08/23/conservative-party-leadership-racelive-coverage.html> [perma.cc/U3BN-VBZX].
164. Worsnop, supra note 161 at 366.
165. Canadian Press, “Federal Government clears path for NHL to have hub city in
Canada: report” CBC Sports (18 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/nhl/
nhl-federal-government-canada-hub-city-1.5618558> [perma.cc/LK5G-6JC4]. See also Sean
Rehaag, “Whose travel is ‘essential’ during coronavirus: Hockey players or asylum-seekers?”
(17 June 2020), online: Te Conversation <theconversation.com/whose-travel-is-essentialduring-coronavirus-hockey-players-or-asylum-seekers-140239> [perma.cc/NF44-DK2W].
166. Joel Dryden, “Banf residents worry U.S. tourists visiting town thanks to so-called ‘Alaska
loophole,’” CBC News (12 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/
banf-tourists-alaska-nina-stewart-michael-buxton-carr-1.5610417> [perma.cc/JV9E-P7CD].
167. See e.g. Janice Dickson, “U.S. man told travelling to Canada to attend son’s birth is
non-essential, denied border crossing,” Te Globe and Mail (15 May 2020), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-us-man-told-travelling-to-canada-to-attend-sons-birthis-non> [perma.cc/QP2S-HRGB].
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these decisions have been largely left up to border ofcials,168 and they have often
appeared quite arbitrary.169
Even less clear are the distinctions being made between asylum-seekers.
Why are asylum seekers who enter Canada between ofcial POEs considered a
public health risk while STCA exempt asylum seekers who enter at ofcial POEs
are not? Without explanations for such distinctions, the Canadian government
cannot reasonably argue that the present public health crisis requires them to
direct asylum seekers entering between ofcial POEs back to the US.
C. COULD THE MEASURES RESULT IN REFOULEMENT?

Te question of whether returning asylum seekers to the US violates Canada’s
non-refoulement obligation was central to the applicants’ arguments in CCR v
Canada. Tey argued that Canada is required to “not only prevent an asylum
seeker’s return to danger” but also to “take afrmative measures to prevent a
risk of harm” by adopting measures that will “not result in [the asylum-seekers’]
removal, directly or indirectly, to a place where their lives or freedom would be
168. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Travel restriction measures:
COVID-19 program delivery” (last updated 12 June 2020), online: <www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/
operational-bulletins-manuals/service-delivery/coronavirus/travel-restrictions.html#purpose>
[perma.cc/M95P-2QEG].
169. See e.g. Brigitte Bureau, “Internal documents show CBSA scenarios to decide who gets
across the border—and who doesn’t,” CBC News (2 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/ottawa/cbsa-document-outlines-scenarios-who-crosses-border-1.5594684> [perma.
cc/LF2Q-BRL6]. Te lack of clear guidance to the CBSA about who is considered “essential”
has been a frequent source of conversation in the meetings of the Special Committee
on the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, Elizabeth May called it “unacceptable” that
CBSA agents “are exercising personal subjective judgment.” See ParlVU, “Meeting No.
12 Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic” (27 May 2020) at 13h:36m, online:
<parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20200527/-1/33322?
Language=English&Stream=Video> [perma.cc/2CUA-DRVV]. Similarly, Marilyn Gladu
has highlighted “a number of inconsistencies in what is considered essential travel on
the U.S. and in the interpretation of diferent CBSA agents,” while Paul Manly spoke
of families stranded overseas with non-Canadian spouses “being forced to make an
impossible decision between sheltering in place overseas or separating from their spouse
in order to return home.” See ParlVU, “Meeting No. 3 Special Committee on the
COVID-19 Pandemic (5 May 2020) at 12h:41m, online: <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/
en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20200505/-1/33132?Language=English&Stream=
Video> [perma.cc/7CJ2-Q3MZ]; ParlVU, “Meeting No. 7 Special Committee on the
COVID-19 Pandemic” (13 May 2020) at 14h:05m, online: <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/
PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20200513/-1/33219?Language=English&Stream=Video>
[perma.cc/2YUD-SC4U].
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in danger.”170 Te Federal Court did not rule directly on whether afrmative
measures are required to avoid “chain refoulement.”171 However, the court did
fnd that the “‘sharing of responsibility’ objective of the STCA should entail
some guarantee of access to a fair refugee process,” that such safeguards were
“largely out of reach and … therefore ‘illusory’” and that, in the case of Ms.
Mustefa, there was a “real and not speculative” risk of refoulement due to the
applicant’s detention in the US and “the challenges in advancing an asylum claim
for those detained.”172
Te current emergency direct-back policy appears to provide even fewer
guarantees that a claimant will have access to a fair refugee process. In our view,
a consideration of American deportation practices since the global pandemic began
requires Canadian ofcials to halt direct backs. Te Department of Homeland
Security website states explicitly that if CBP cannot return “illegal immigrants”
to Canada or Mexico, they “will return these aliens to their country of origin.”173
In addition to evidence that the US has further breached its obligations under
international law at its southern border during the pandemic,174 evidence has
emerged that the American government “has aggressively begun to rush the
deportations of some of the most vulnerable migrant children in its care.”175
Tis is in addition to a presidential memo dictating that any country refusing to
accept deportees may be penalized with visa sanctions.176
170. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 59.
171. Chain refoulement has been described as “the removal of a refugee … indirectly through a
third country.” See John Doe et al v Canada (2005), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 78/11 Annual
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc
69 at para 103.
172. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 128, 130, 106.
173. DHS, supra note 126.
174. US Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Press Release, “Leahy Leads Judiciary Committee
Democrats in Demanding Answers About DHS’ Newly Claimed Authorities to Override
Federal Laws at Southern Border” (7 April 2020), online: <www.leahy.senate.gov/press/
leahy-leads-judiciary-committee-democrats-in-demanding-answers_about-dhs-newlyclaimed-authorities-to-override-federal-laws-at-southern-border> [perma.cc/8WS2-6ERY];
Michael Garcia Bochenek, “Trump Administration Uses Pandemic as Excuse to Expel
Migrants” (20 May 2020), online: Human Rights Watch <www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/21/
trump-administration-uses-pandemic-excuse-expel-migrants> [perma.cc/45P6-PYX6].
175. Lomi Kriel, “Te Trump Administration Is Rushing Deportations of Migrant Children
During Coronavirus” (18 May 2020), online: Propublica <www.propublica.org/article/
the-trump-administration-is-rushing-deportations-of-migrant-children-during-coronavirus>
[perma.cc/ELN8-Q6SG].
176. United States, Presidential Memoranda, Memorandum on Visa Sanctions (2020),
online: <www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-visa-sanctions>
[perma.cc/6RLR-NN8M].
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Tese practices disregard the UNHCR’s warnings against restrictions on
access to asylum which “may contribute to the further spread” of COVID-19.177
Tere are numerous reports of deportees from the US being returned to their
countries of origin despite testing positive for COVID-19,178 contributing to the
rise of cases in those countries.179 Tis is especially concerning in light of reports
about COVID-19 circulating in US detention facilities.180
None of this evidence was before the Federal Court in CCR v Canada.
In our view, it demonstrates that US refugee protection failures have only been
exacerbated in the past several months.
Canadian ofcials have indicated that they have discussed these issues with
their American counterparts. However, other than indicating that refugee issues
are “very important” to Canada, they have not provided any details about what
kind of assurances they have received from the US.181 Tey have, however,
repeatedly afrmed that “asylum seekers who try to take the Roxham path are
re-directed to the U.S.”182 Canadian ofcials appear far more concerned with
assuring critics that asylum-seekers are being kept out of the country than they
are with ensuring that Canada is not complicit in chain refoulement.

177. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 9.
178. See e.g. Arshad Mohammed, Julia Symmes Cobb & Frank Jack Daniel, “Two dozen
people deported to Colombia on U.S. fight found to have coronavirus: sources,” Reuters
(29 April 2020), online: <www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-colombia/
two-dozen-people-deported-to-colombia-on-u-s-fight-found-to-have-coronavirussources-idUSKBN22B3DB> [perma.cc/8QHP-669S]; Isabel Macdonald, “US to
deport Haitians who’ve tested positive for coronavirus: NGO” (10 May 2020),
online: Al Jazeera <www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/deport-haitians-tested-positivecoronavirus-ngo-200510202833575.html> [perma.cc/B8JW-EWNG].
179. Jonathan Blitzer, “Te Trump Administration’s Deportation Policy is Spreading the
Coronavirus,” Te New Yorker (13 May 2020), online: <www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/the-trump-administrations-deportation-policy-is-spreading-the-coronavirus>
[perma.cc/CJ7X-A6QD].
180. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
181. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Federal ministers and Health Ofcials Provide
COVID-19 Update” (26 March 2020) at 13m:58s, online (video): <cpac.ca/en/programs/
covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66177165> [perma.cc/5YJN-6FG5].
182. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Federal Ministers and Health Ofcials Provide
COVID-19 Update” (22 April 2020) at 17m:37s, online (video): <www.cpac.ca/en/
programs/covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66189572> [perma.cc/454D-SGPE].
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D. ARE THE MEASURES TAKEN NON-DISCRIMINATORY?

Finally, the UNHCR has emphasized that all measures implemented to manage
risks to public health must be non-discriminatory.183 Similarly, the ICCPR
requires that measures taken “not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
… sex.”184 However, the government’s actions extend the application of a policy
which, according to the applicants in CCR v Canada, contravenes the guarantees
to equal protection and equal beneft of the law without discrimination under
section 15 of the Charter.185
Although the Federal Court declined to address these arguments because
of its other fndings about how the STCA violates the Charter, the Court
heard extensive evidence about how the STCA results “in a discriminatory
distinction on the basis of sex” because female asylum seekers face barriers in
accessing protection in the US.186 For example, the applicants in CCR v Canada
highlighted the “disproportionate efect on women of the one-year bar,”187 which
is an American policy requiring asylum-seekers to “make their claim within one
year of arrival in the U.S. to be eligible for asylum.”188 Te applicants presented
evidence that women miss this deadline “at a rate 13 per cent higher than men”
because they are “often more reluctant to disclose their experiences to anyone—let
alone government ofcials—due to trauma, shame, and cultural norms tolerating
gender-based persecution or that make discussing it taboo.”189
Te applicants also highlighted barriers faced by women feeing gender-based
persecution (GBP) “due to a restrictive interpretation of key aspects of the refugee
defnition.”190 It is well-established in Canadian refugee law that “although gender
is not one of the grounds specifed in the Refugee Convention, the Convention can
be interpreted to grant protection to women who establish a well-founded fear of
gender-based persecution” on account of their membership in a particular social
group.191 By contrast, the applicants highlighted several ways in which “the US
interpretation of the refugee defnition excludes protection for women feeing
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at paras 5-7.
Mosher, supra note 116 at 930-31.
CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 151-153.
CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 93.
Ibid at para 95.
Ibid at para 32.
Ibid at para 35.
Ibid at para 95.
Sonia Akibo-Betts, “Te Canada-U.S. Safe Tird Country Agreement: Reinforcing Refugee
Protection or putting Refugees at Risk” (2006) 6 J Institute Justice & Intl Studies 1 at 6. See
also Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689.
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GBP by private actors.”192 Tey explained that by issuing a precedential decision
in the Matter of A-B-, the American Attorney General established that “claims
by aliens pertaining to domestic violence … will not qualify for asylum.”193 Te
applicants argued that the Matter of A-B- makes it “nearly impossible” for asylum
seekers feeing GBP to receive asylum in the US.194
We agree with the applicants’ assessment. In addition, we note that the situation
facing female asylum seekers in the US has been threatened further since closing
arguments in CCR v Canada were heard. Te Trump administration recently
proposed amendments which would further prohibit the Secretary of Homeland
Security from “favorably adjudicat[ing]” refugee claims founded on GBP.195
Tese policies difer dramatically from Canadian refugee law practice. Many
have highlighted “Canada’s international reputation for its recognition of ” GBP
claims and have argued that asylum seekers feeing GBP have good reason to
seek asylum in Canada rather than the US.196 In our view, the de facto extension
of the STCA amplifes the discriminatory efect which the applicants detailed in
their submissions.
In light of the signifcant concerns raised in CCR v Canada, we were surprised
to learn that “[n]o gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) impacts” were identifed in
the government’s consideration of the IRPR changes outlined above.197 We would
be interested to know how this conclusion was reached, and feel that a more
thorough GBA+ is warranted.198

192.
193.
194.
195.

CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 38.
Ibid at para 38. For a detailed discussion of this policy, see Holliday, supra note 50.
CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at paras 40, 95.
Homeland Security Department and the Executive Ofce for Immigration Review,
“Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Fear and Reasonable Fear
Review” (15 June 2020), online: Federal Register <www.federalregister.gov/documents/
2020/06/15/2020-12575/procedures-for-asylum-and-withholding-of-removal-credible-fearand-reasonable-fear-review> [perma.cc/HTM9-BN4X].
196. Sonia Akibo-Betts, “Te Canada-U.S. Safe Tird Country Agreement: Why the U.S. Is Not
a Safe Haven for Refugee Women Asserting Gender-Based Asylum Claims” (2005) 19
Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 105; Ibid at 111; Carasco, supra note 30 at 326-27.
197. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 93; Canada Gazette, 2020, supra
note 103 at 558. For a discussion of GBA+ processes, see Status of Women Canada, “What
is GBA+ (Gender-based Analysis Plus)” (4 December 2018), online: <cfc-swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/
index-en.html>.
198. If it is found that no GBA+ impacts exist, government ofcials must “demonstrate why there
aren’t any gendered dimensions.” See Francesca Scala & Stephanie Paterson, “Gendering
Public Policy or Rationalizing Gender? Strategic Interventions and GBA+ Practice in
Canada” (2017) 50 Can J of Political Science 427 at 437.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Te Canadian government’s decision to implement the de facto STCA extension
in the name of public health was not, as is required by the ICCPR, “the least
restrictive of the options available” to the government to combat the spread
of COVID-19.199 Further, the Canadian government was not in a situation
where they had “no reasonable alternatives to prevent the introduction or
spread of ” COVID-19.200
Canada had many other reasonable policy alternatives available, such as
including all asylum seekers amongst those travellers “with a worthy purpose”
who are entitled to enter the country despite border closures, as Denmark
has.201 Various screening and quarantine measures could also have been pursued.
Instead, Canada chose emergency measures which violate obligations towards
asylum-seekers under international law.
We believe that the Canadian government should take steps to rectify these
errors and to ensure that the human rights of asylum seekers are respected.
At a minimum, Canada should immediately stop using the pandemic as a pretext
for further closing the border to refugees.202 Not only has the STCA itself been
held to be unconstitutional, but no convincing public health justifcation has
been advanced for extending it even further. Te de facto extension of the STCA
appears to be nothing more than a cynical attempt to leverage a crisis to make a
political problem go away. Te direct backs should end, and it should be made

199. Mosher, supra note 116 at 932.
200. Quarantine Act, supra note 99, s 58(d).
201. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Information Sheet 28 May 2020: COVID-19
Measures Related to Asylum and Migration Across Europe” (28 May 2020) at 3, online:
<www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-INFO-28-May.pdf> [perma.
cc/5KPR-UCZJ] [ECRE]; International Organization of Migration, Issue Brief,
COVID-19 Identifcation and Monitoring of Emerging Immigration, Consular and Visa
Needs (IOM, April 2020) at 2, online (pdf ): <www.iom.int/sites/default/fles/our_work/
DMM/IBM/2020/en/covid-19iomissuebrief-immigrationconsularandvisarecommen
dations.pdf> [perma.cc/V89Z-2RSJ]. For details on the Portuguese response, see Mia
Alberti & Vasco Cotovio, “Portugal give migrants and asylum-seekers full citizenship
rights during coronavirus outbreak,” CNN (31 March 2020), online: <edition.cnn.
com/2020/03/30/europe/portugal-migrants-citizenship-rights-coronavirus-intl/index.html>
[perma.cc/N9NG-NKBD].
202. We use the term “further” to recognize that the Canadian government has been involved
in closing the border to refugees in various ways for many years. See e.g. Scott D Watson,
Te Securitization of Humanitarian Migration : Digging Moats and Sinking Boats (Taylor &
Francis Group, 2009) at 121-30; Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 378-80.
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clear that asylum seekers cannot be penalized for entering the country between
POEs, as is their right under international law.
Better yet, Canada should demonstrate leadership by insisting that crossing
the border to seek asylum is amongst the most essential forms of international
travel. Tis leadership is necessary now more than ever. Refugees around the
world face heightened risks as many states limit their ability to travel to seek
asylum in response to the global pandemic.203 Canada should be a champion for
asylum seekers, not another country using the pandemic to erect further barriers
to their movement.
Tis leadership can be shown by halting plans to appeal CCR v Canada,
by accepting the Federal Court’s fnding that the STCA is unconstitutional and
by immediately suspending the STCA. Te US has long been unsafe for at least
some refugees. It has become dramatically less safe under Trump’s leadership.
American responses to the global pandemic have made things even worse.
Te Canadian government has acknowledged that it can safely process
refugee claims during a pandemic by processing STCA exempt asylum seekers
without issue. As the Federal Court found, no “current justifable purpose”
is served by treating diferently those refugee claimants who “have the beneft of
the exemptions carved out in the STCA” and those who do not.204 If the STCA
is suspended, asylum seekers who do not meet these exemptions could enter the
country at ofcial POEs through the same process that STCA exempt asylum
seekers are currently safely following. Tey could be screened for the virus. Tey
could be appropriately quarantined.
Until Canada makes these changes, asylum seekers caught crossing between
ofcial POEs will be directed back to a country where they face a serious risk of
refoulement and other rights violations. Tis policy will only encourage asylum
seekers to cross the border in places where they will not be detected and to move
underground when they come to Canada, because incentives to engage with the
state do “not exist where individuals enter clandestinely.”205 As a result, asylum
seekers will not be screened for COVID-19 or quarantined upon entry. Tese
policies do not “protect Canadians,” they endanger them.

203. UNHCR reports that at least ninety-nine countries that have fully or partially closed their
borders are making no exceptions for asylum seekers at all. See United Nations, “Policy
Brief: COVID-19 and People on the Move” (5 June 2020) at 19, online (pdf ): UN <www.
un.org/sites/un2.un.org/fles/sg_policy_brief_on_people_on_the_move.pdf> [perma.cc/
C4GX-V8L9]; See generally ECRE, supra note 200.
204. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 147-48.
205. Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 423.
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In the wake of the SARS epidemic, Janet Mosher highlighted that pandemics
can present “an opportunity for us to rethink” necessary legal frameworks.206
We urge the Canadian government to take this opportunity to suspend the STCA,
to revoke its de facto extension and to rethink what travel is, truly, “essential.”

206. Mosher, supra note 116 at 955.

